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AND A RETURN TO THE SUPREME COURT'S VISION FOR
VIEWPOINT-SPECIFIC SPEECH REGULATION POLICY
Brad Dickens"
Federal and circuit courts continue to fiercely debate whether the
Supreme Court's 1988 ruling in Hazelwood v. Kuhineier requires school
policies regulating student speech and expression to be viewpoint neutral.
However, this note suggests that the language of Hazelwood itself shows
that the Circuit debate may be misguided. The Supreme Court intended
Hazelwood to stand as a narrow exception to its earlier holding in Tinker,
and Hazelwood only applies in instances where the government's own
voice is implicated, largely in a public context. When the school, and in
effect the government, is speaking with its own voice, the school must be
able to control the content and nature of such speech as a matter of
practicality. Any requirement of viewpoint neutrality in this context is
simply unnecessary and conflicts with the Court's own precedent relating to
government speech. When schools are allowed to operate the way
Hazelwood intended, they are able to effectively execute their educational
mission, and students are able to appropriately exercise their First
Amendment rights via Tinker without the overly cumbersome burden of
viewpoint neutral speech policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The public school classroom is on the front lines in the battle of defining
the First Amendment. Almost daily, new cases and incidents arise that
probe the outer bounds of the First Amendment and the authority of schools
to regulate student speech. In Tampa, Florida, in 2012, an elementary
school principal prohibited a fourth grade student from distributing
invitations to his classmates for an Easter egg hunt.794 In Oklahoma City, a
J.D., Baylor University, expected May 2014; B.A., Texas A&M University, 2011. Thank you to Jeff
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five-year-old student was forced to take off his shirt on the playground and
turn it inside out because it was a University of Michigan shirt and violated
the school's policy of only allowing University of Oklahoma or Oklahoma
State University shirts."' In Prague, Oklahoma, a high school valedictorian
had her diploma withheld indefinitely for saying "hell" in her graduation
speech.796 In Kountze, Texas, a high school found itself in federal district
court over a district policy prohibiting the cheerleading squad from
displaying a banner that read, "If God Is For Us, Who Can Be Against
Us."79 Administrators, teachers, parents, and students in districts and
communities across the nation struggle to understand and apply school
speech policies that comply with the parameters of the First Amendment.
In 1969, the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines made an effort to
define the scope and character of the First Amendment in a classroom
context. Tinker produced the oft-quoted dictum that "it can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech at the schoolhouse gate." 9" Tinker remains a
foundational case for school-related speech, and yet its language leaves
ambiguities in the analytical framework that cannot be ignored. Just how far
does the "schoolhouse gate" go? What precisely is a school's educational
mission?
In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, the Court supplemented the foundational
rule from Tinker to answer another difficult question left open by Tinker:
how far can schools go in restricting speech on campus when the speech
appears to carry the school's approval (as in a school newspaper), rather
than being a clearly private communication (as in a student wearing an
armband in protest)?7 99 The Court held that "educators do not offend the
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns".o
available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/lawsuit-alleges-hillsborough-school-blocked-
free-speech-religious/1247240.
795 Carrie Coppernoll, District to Reviewv Dress Code after Boy, 5, Told to Fix Shirt, OKLAHOMAN, Aug.
21, 2012, available at http://newsok.com/okc-schools-to-review-dress-code-after-kindergartner-told-to-
turn-shirt-inside-out/article/3703012.
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Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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The language of the Court's opinion leaves unanswered the question of
whether school policies may restrict speech on the basis of a specific
viewpoint or must instead remain viewpoint neutral.o' This issue is fiercely
debated among the circuits and carries with it significant implications for
the boundaries of speech rights of students in American classrooms.802
This note surveys the body of circuit case law on school viewpoint
neutrality, and ultimately to makes a case in favor of reading Hazelwood to
authorize viewpoint-specific speech restrictions.
First, Hazelwood, by its own language, applies only to speech that could
be interpreted as government-endorsed; it acts as a narrow exception to the
general rule from Tinker, rather than a new separate standard for public
school policy.0 3 Given Hazelwood's position as a narrow exception
triggered only when the government's own imprimatur is implicated
circumstantially, a viewpoint neutrality standard is incompatible with the
justification for Hazelwood's exception. The government may, and
inevitably does, convey and endorse viewpoints, and it has an interest in
maintaining integrity and singularity in its voice. Thus, a public school may
regulate certain student speech precisely because of the viewpoint of that
speech when it is reasonably perceived as carrying the school's
endorsement.804 Hazelwood recognizes that schools have an interest in
maintaining their own messaging as they carry out their educational
function.
Second, this note argues that the actual operation of a viewpoint
neutrality requirement perversely incentivizes either a neglect of legitimate
speech regulation or unnecessarily broad and inefficient prohibitions on
speech, which would yield greater burdens on individual discourse than
would result from viewpoint-focused regulation. When schools control
801 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001) ("[I]t is not clear whether a State's
interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination"); Denise
Daugherty, Free Speech in Public Schools: Has the Supreme Court Created a Haven for Viewpoint
Discrimination in School-Sponsored Speech?, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2004); Emily Gold
Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored
Seech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 90 (2008).
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113; Daugherty, supra note 8, at 1062; Waldman, supra note 8, at 90.
803 Hazelood, 484 U.S. at 272-73 ("[W]e conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for
determining when a school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining
when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression.").
804 Alexis Zouhary, The Elephant in the Classroom: A Proposed Framevork for Applying Vieupoint
Neutraliy to Student Speech in the Secondary School Setting, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2227, 2235 36
(2008) ("[T]he only area in which the government may unequivocally make viewpoint-based
distinctions is when it is the speaker.").
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speech over concerns of school endorsement of certain messages,
viewpoint-neutral regulation is too blunt an instrument, unnecessarily
censoring benign speech outside the scope of the concerns that gave rise to
regulation. By contrast, viewpoint regulation within the bounds of
Hazelwood allows schools to identify speech that is especially problematic,
restricting only what is necessary to allow the school to maintain the
integrity of its pedagogical voice.
II. HAZELWOOD'S FOUNDATION
In 1983, the principal of Hazelwood East High School removed several
pages from the final draft of Spectrum, the high school student
newspaper."' Of concern to the principal were two articles on teen
pregnancy and divorce, both of which contained interviews with students
from the high school.806 The principal decided that there was not enough
time to edit the objectionable portions of the stories before the paper went
to print, so he chose to remove the two articles entirely in an effort to
maintain the deadline.807 Students in the journalism class responsible for the
articles brought an action against the school alleging that it had violated
their First Amendment rights.as The district court found that the principal
had a "legitimate and reasonable concern" that readers would be able to
easily discern the identities of the anonymous students mentioned in the
article.809 The district court affirmed this by holding the school had the right
to censor the speech based on its belief that the articles could be interpreted
as the school's endorsement of certain sexual norms. 10
The Eight Circuit reversed the decision."' Applying Tinker, the circuit
court held that the school had established a public forum through the
newspaper, and as such, the school could only restrict speech that
substantially interfered with school operations.812
The Supreme Court reversed.' The Court began its opinion with a tip of
the hat to its holding from Tinker, acknowledging that the First Amendment
805 Hazelivood, 484 U.S. at 263 264.
806 Id. at 263.
807 Id. at 263-64.
80 8 Id. at 264.
809 Id. at 264-65.
810 Id.
8i1 Hazelood, 484 U.S. at 265.
812 Id.; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
813 Hazelivood, 484 U.S. at 266.
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extends into schools, but noting that the school environment is a unique one
for civil liberties. 14
Early in the opinion, the Court critically established that a school
newspaper is not a public forum, but did not go so far as to label the paper a
non-public forum."' The Hazelwood School District did not open the
school newspaper up to "indiscriminate use" by the student body, choosing
instead to maintain the intellectual space of the paper as an outlet for
student learning within the context of a graded journalism class." 6 Though
the Court applied the "policy or practice" standard from Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association to defeat any argument
that the paper is a classic public forum, it stopped short of giving it non-
public forum status with that classification's accompanying requirement of
viewpoint neutrality.817 This odd designation gave rise to the circuit conflict
explored herein.
The Court further clarified the departure from Tinker later in the opinion,
holding that Tinker does not require that its standards apply to speech that
could be seen as being officially endorsed by the school."' In other words,
there is a difference between the effects of students expressing their views
as individuals and students speaking in a manner that appears to represent
the school (i.e., the government).
Writing for the majority, Justice White explained that "educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school sponsored activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."819
However, the "pedagogical concern" standard only represents half of the
complete Hazelwood authorization. This form of editorial control of speech
is only authorized when there is a reasonable perception that the speech to
be regulated bears the school's imprimatur.820 These elements together form
the Hazelwood rule.
814 Id.
815 Id. at 267; Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of
the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 717,
772 73 (2009).
816 Hazelivood, 484 U.S. at 270.
817 Id at 269.
8is Id at 269 n.2.
8 1 Id. at 273.
820 Hazelivood, 484 U.S. at 270.
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III. HAZELWOOD'S LEGACY
The American legal community has viewed the Court's decision in
Hazelwood as both controversial and polarizing.82'
Beneath the pedagogical concern standard lies an important but
ultimately unanswered question: must school policies restricting speech,
while still connected to a pedagogical concern, also be viewpoint neutral?
Earlier opinions from the Supreme Court in Perry822 and Cornelius82 3
established a viewpoint neutrality requirement for policies controlling
speech in a nonpublic forum. This precedent would normally be controlling
without much controversy, but the Court had already spent a great deal of
time and text noting that a public school classroom is a different
environment and context than "the real world" of the rough and tumble
public square.824 Do Perry and Cornelius apply to classroom policies, or is
Hazelwood's silence on viewpoint neutrality indicative of a new rule
uniquely tailored to the school context?
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Circuit Courts remain divided on whether Hazelwood requires viewpoint
neutrality for school district policies on student speech like those in the
case. Some circuits have interpreted the Court's holding in Hazelwood as a
kind of special exception to viewpoint neutrality, allowing schools to zero
in on specific messages in an effort to, for instance, avoid a violation of the
Establishment Clause.825 Other circuits, however, see the spirit of Cornelius
and Perry as inherently interwoven into Hazelwood's standard, so much so
that viewpoint neutrality is understood and does not require a mention.
821 Susannah Barton Tobin, Divining Hazelood: The Need for A Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in
School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 228 (2004); Edward L. Carter, Kevin R.
Kemper & Barbara L. Morgenstern, Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum Doctrine and
Government Speech in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 157, 161-62 (2006); Rosemary
C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of Hazeliwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253,
274-75 (1992).
822 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
823 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
824 Hazelivood, 484 U.S. at 266-67.
825 Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 633 (2d Cir. 2005) (viewing
prevention of Establishment Clause violations as a potentially compelling justification for viewpoint
discrimination).
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A. Viewpoint Neutral Circuits
The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that school
policies limiting student speech and expression must be viewpoint
neutral.826
In Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District, a
kindergarten student created a poster as part of an assignment to
demonstrate what he had learned over the year about ways to help the
environment.827 Antonio, the student, included pictures of Jesus and several
other religious symbols because of his belief that Jesus was the only way to
save the planet.8 28 The school folded over the poster to conceal the religious
content.829 On remand from the Second Circuit, the district court held that
the school's censorship of the poster was based on legitimate pedagogical
concerns, namely that Antonio could not articulate to the class the
connection between images of Jesus and saving the environment.so
However before the fact question of viewpoint neutrality could even be
decided by the district court on remand, the Second Circuit sought to
extract from precedent the applicability of viewpoint neutrality to school
policy.' The court aptly began its analysis by acknowledging the circuit
dispute into which it was about to involve itself.832 The court recognized the
plausibility of arguments on either side, but ultimately folded the Perry and
Cornelius nonpublic forum standards into its interpretation of the
Hazelwood doctrine.13 Hazelwood, the court noted, never distinguished its
facts with Perry or Cornelius, suggesting that the court did not intend to
establish any kind of exception or new rule in its opinion.8 34 The court
ultimately concluded its viewpoint analysis with, "we decline the District's
826 See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 356 (6th Cir. 2001), reh'g granted and opinion vacated,
197 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999), on rehg en banc, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that state
university's withholding of yearbooks on title grounds unauthorized because not viewpoint-neutral);
Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada, Inc. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir.
1991); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 1989).
827 Peck, 426 F.3d at 621-22.
828 Id. at 621-22.
829 Id. at 622.
830 Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2008 WL 4527598, at *23 (N.D.N.Y. Sep.
30, 2008).
831 Peck, 426 F.3d at 632-33.
832 Id. at 631-32.
833 Id. at 632 33.
834 Id. at 633.
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invitation to depart, without clear direction from the Supreme Court, from
what has, to date, remained a core facet of First Amendment protection."
In Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada v. Clark County School
District, a high school prevented Planned Parenthood from placing
advertisements in a school-sponsored publication."' Representatives for the
school asserted that to allow the advertisements would present the
impression that the high school had taken a stance on one side of the
divisive issue of abortion.8 37 First, the court identified the publication as a
nonpublic forum. 3 1 With this analysis in hand, the court then matter-of-
factly concluded that any school policy within the nonpublic forum context
must be viewpoint neutral in light of Cornelius.839 Two paragraphs later, the
court made its case for the legitimacy of the school's policy by citing to
Hazelwood while also including "see also Cornelius" in the in-line
citation.840 In this paragraph, the justices attempted to connect the general
viewpoint neutrality requirement from Cornelius to the specific school
context of Hazelwood. By citing the cases together, the court implied that
Hazelwood was merely an application of a larger principle from Cornelius,
and there could be no real interpretation of the rule that might deviate (or at
least provide an exception to) from the viewpoint neutrality requirement.84 1
In Kincaid, the Sixth Circuit considered a case in which Kentucky State
University confiscated and refused to distribute a version of the school's
yearbook.842 The editor of the yearbook wanted to "bring Kentucky State
into the nineties," and included pictures of current world events, abstract
phrases like "Destination Unknown," and pictures without captions.84 3 The
administration objected to the yearbook's design and content as
inappropriate and did not allow the yearbooks to be distributed on
campus.844 The Court appropriately recognized the case's obvious parallels
to the facts of Hazelwood, but ultimately distinguished the case based on
the level of involvement by the KSU administration in the yearbook's
835 Id.
836 Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 821.
837 Id. at 819.
Id at 826-827.
839 Id at 829.
840 Id.
841 The Ninth Circuit later appears to marginalize its own holding from Planned Parenthood in Dowvns.
Doins v. Los Angeles UnifiedSch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000). The Downs court points
out that Planned Parenthood provides no real basis for a viewpoint neutrality requirement in
Hazebood. Id at 1010.
842 Kincaid, 191 F.3d at 722.
843 Id. at 723.
844 Id.
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production.845 The court spent a considerable amount of time in its opinion
analyzing the type of forum created by the yearbook. 4 6 The interesting
aspect of the court's forum analysis is that the court created its own
unnecessary burden;84 7 early in the opinion, Hazelwood was described as
requiring viewpoint neutrality in a nonpublic forum.848 Presumably because
the actual language of Hazelwood gives no such requirement, the court also
cited International Society for Krishna Consciousness as the basis for this
assertion.849 However, Krishna occurred in an airport, entirely outside the
scope or applicability of Hazelwood's bounds.5 o
In Searcey v. Harris, the Atlanta School Board restricted the Atlanta
Peace Alliance ("APA") from any involvement in Atlanta public high
schools, including involvement in "career days."151 The school board had
adopted a policy stating in part, "participants shall not be allowed to
criticize or denigrate the career opportunities provided by other
participants."8 52 The policy further stated that any group in violation of this
policy would be "totally prohibited from participating in Career Day.""' In
its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit applied logic similar to that of the Second
Circuit in Peck.8 54 Having established the school, and in particular Career
Day, as a nonpublic forum, the court placed the facts within the Hazelwood
framework-which it conceived as adopting that classification. The
Eleventh Circuit was not willing to interpret Hazelwood's silence on
viewpoint neutrality as indicating an absence of that standard.5 Instead, the
court concluded, "there is no indication that the [Supreme] Court intended
to drastically rewrite First Amendment law to allow a school official to
discriminate based on a speaker's views."856
B. Circuits Authorizing Viewpoint Regulation
Not all courts, however, see viewpoint neutrality as an inherent
implication of the Hazelwood standard. The First, Third, and Tenth Circuits
845 Id. at 727.
846 Id. at 727-28.
847 Kincaid, 191 F.3d at 728 29.
848 Id. at 727.
849 Id.
850 See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674 (1992).
851 Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1315 (11th Cir. 1989).
852 Id. at 1317.
853 Id. at 1317-18.
854 Id. at 1319-20.
855 Id. at 1319.
856 Id. at 1319 n.7.
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have held that while school policies must still be grounded in reasonability,
student speech can be restricted on the basis of viewpoint.8 57 Avoiding a
violation of the Establishment Clause, for instance, constitutes a compelling
state interest that justifies a restriction of specific student speech."'
In Ward v. Hickey, a high school biology teacher facilitated a class
discussion concerning abortion of fetuses with Down's Syndrome,
specifically as it pertained to a Massachusetts referendum on the issue.859
Allegedly due to the content of the discussion, the school committee denied
the teacher tenure."60 The First Circuit addressed several questions on
appeal; of particular concern for purposes of this note was the issue of
whether Ward's particular discussion of abortion was protected by the First
Amendment or instead subject to regulation under the authority of
Hazelwood."' The court focused its viewpoint analysis around Perry and
acknowledged the Supreme Court's holding that government policies must
not seek to suppress expression due to the viewpoint expressed.862 However,
the court interestingly concluded that, in light of the Hazelwood standard,863
Perry is distinguishable from the facts of Ward, and its holding did not
apply.864 The court believed that the greatest difference between these two
cases was the presence in Ward of a captive audience of impressionable
young students (unlike the faculty mail system in Perry).65
The First Circuit's distinction of Ward and Perry as they relate to
Hazelwood is significant, particularly when the court concluded that
Hazelwood did not require viewpoint neutrality in school policies.866 In
doing so, the court suggested that the stakes are higher when young
impressionable minds are in question. The court interpreted Hazelwood as
857 See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993); C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167,
172-73 (3d Cir. 1999) rehg en banc granted, opinion vacated sub nom C.H. v. Oliva, 197 F.3d 63 (3d
Cir. 1999), and on rehg en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000); Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. School Dist.,
298 F.3d 918, 926 (10th Cir. 2002).
858 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) ("In order to justify discriminatory exclusion
from a public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the university must
therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must showv that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest."); accord Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
465 (1980).
859 Ward, 996 F.2d at 450.
860 Id.8 6 1 Id. at 452-54.
862 Id. at 454.
863 Id.
864 Id.
865 Ward, 996 F.2d at 454.
866 Id. (citing Hazelood, 484 U.S. at 270).
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authorizing viewpoint regulation in the interest of preserving the student
learning experience, a "legitimate pedagogical concern .""'
In Morgan v. Swanson, a public elementary school prohibited a student
from distributing laminated bookmarks containing a story titled "The
Legend of the Candy Cane,"868 citing the Plano Independent School
District's policy prohibiting the distribution of "any written material, tapes,
or other media over which the school does not exercise control and that is
intended for distribution to students" without approval from the school.86 9
One of the more significant arguments raised on appeal by the plaintiff
was that the school's policy was facially unconstitutional because of an
absolute rule against viewpoint discrimination.8 70 The Fifth Circuit said,
succinctly, "this is not so."'117 The court noted that the case at issue arose
within a public school, an environment the court labeled "a special First
Amendment Context."8 72 The court acknowledged the plaintiffs citation of
a variety of cases suggesting a mandate of viewpoint neutrality, but it then
summarily rejected the applicability of the cases, as not one of them
involved student speech within a public school.8 7' Though Judge Benavides
identified the contested issue of viewpoint neutrality within the context of
an attempt to decide a qualified immunity claim,8 4 it is still worth noting
that the Fifth Circuit did not consider viewpoint neutrality an absolute
standard in the school context. In this way, Morgan suggests a willingness
by the Fifth Circuit to isolate the public school classroom from the general
mandates in Perry and Cornelius, implying that the school environment is
unique, and it would be inappropriate to apply to it a viewpoint neutrality
requirement.
In C.H. ex rel. ZH. v. Oliva, the Third Circuit considered a case in which
a kindergarten student created a poster for a Thanksgiving-themed project
expressing thankfulness for Jesus, and the school censored the poster.875 The
same student was also prohibited a year later (as a first grader) from
867 Id. at 452 (quoting Hazelwvood, 484 U.S. at 273).
868 Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2011).
869 Id. at 366-67.
870 Id. at 379.
871 Id.
872 Id.
873 Morgan, 659 F.3d at 379.
874 Id. at 383.
875 C.H ex rel. ZH,195 F.3d at 168-69.
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bringing a biblical-themed book to share with the class.876 In determining
the validity of the school's actions against the student, the court
appropriately identified Hazelwood as the controlling case.87 The court
ultimately held that instances can and do arise in which a school must be
able to take non-viewpoint-neutral action against certain speech,
recognizing Hazelwood's requirements of both legitimate pedagogical
concern and the appearance of the school's imprimatur in that context."'
The court acknowledged that while viewpoint neutrality remains crucial to
the analysis of speech restrictions in the context of cases like Rosenberger
and Lamb 's Chapel, which related to extracurricular speech restrictions, it
"is simply not applicable to restrictions on the State's own speech . . . . In
[teacher-supervised, school-sponsored activity], viewpoint neutrality is
neither necessary nor appropriate."8 79 The government must have the ability
to control the messages that are reasonably assigned to it, and consequently
should not be artificially shackled by an arbitrary requirement of viewpoint
neutrality.
V. THE CASE AGAINST VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY
Hazelwood provides an exception to the general requirement of
viewpoint neutrality found in Perry and Cornelius. The case against
requiring viewpoint neutrality in school speech policy operates on two
levels. First, the Hazelwood standard applies to a far narrower and more
specific context than some federal courts choose to recognize. Schools must
be given the authority they need, though not more than they need, to
regulate the kinds of student speech that attach to the name and symbolic
voice of the school. Second, a requirement of viewpoint neutral speech
regulation can impel school officials to restrict wide categories of speech in
order to regulate the single expression of speech bearing the school's
imprimatur. Simply, a requirement of administrative viewpoint neutrality
substantially limits students' civil liberties by applying a kind of atomic
bomb to the free speech landscape when a precision targeting device is
better suited.
876 Id. at 169.
Id. at 171.
8 Id. at 171-72.
8 Id. at 173.
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A. Reigning in Hazelwood
A great deal of the debate over viewpoint neutrality in Hazelwood arises
not from the language of the opinion itself, but rather from an unnecessary
insistence by some federal courts to insert its rule into contexts in which it
does not apply." The school imprimatur standard within Hazelwood acts as
a kind of jurisdictional trigger, confining the Court's holding to that narrow
context. When lower courts ignore the narrow circumstances in which
Hazelwood applies, they lose sight of the justification for Hazelwood's
viewpoint-regulation allowance. This leads to courts' expanding the reach
of Hazelwood beyond the circumstances justifying its rule; it is hardly
surprising that these courts then read an otherwise-alien viewpoint
neutrality requirement into the case.
1. Morse v. Frederick's Affirmation of Hazelwood's Scope
In 2007, the Supreme Court considered a school's authority to restrict
student speech advocating illegal drug use in Morse v. Frederick.' The
Court held that schools have the authority to limit student speech that
promotes drug use.882 The majority acknowledged its holding from
Hazelwood, the last case it had considered regarding student speech, but
ultimately held that it did not apply to the present facts.' The Court
reasoned that Frederick's banner displaying the phrase "Bong Hits 4 Jesus"
simply would not be reasonably interpreted by a viewer as official school
speech; the banner did not trigger Hazelwood's fact-specific imprimatur
rule.884
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, cautioned in concurrence that
the Court's holding should stand as a narrow exception to Tinker, not as
conceptual fodder for a new rule category."' Justice Alito agreed that a
public school regulation restricting student promotion of illicit drug use
880 Waldman, supra note 8, at 64 ("[W]hen evaluating whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint
discrimination, courts have been influenced, perhaps without realizing it, by the context in which they
are applying it. As such, the extension of Hazelwood to contexts beyond school-sponsored student
speech has directly contributed to the confusion and conflict over whether Hazelivood should be
interpreted as permitting viewpoint discrimination.").
881 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).
882 Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
883 Id. at 405 ("[Hazelwood] does not control this case because no one would reasonably believe that
Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur.").
884 Id.
885 Id. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
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does not conflict with the Constitution, but also identified "such regulation
as standing at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits.""'
Alito suggested that Bethel v. Fraser,"' Hazelwood, and now Morse all
function as a set of exceptions to Tinker that only take effect under a highly
specific set of circumstances."'
Adding clarity to a point raised by the majority, Justice Alito emphasized
a critical but often ignored aspect of Hazelwood: the "pedagogical concern"
standard's sole application to speech that may reasonably be perceived as
coming from the mouth of the school itself. "[Hazelwood] allows a school
to regulate what is in essence the school's own speech," Justice Alitio
wrote; "that is, articles that appear in a publication that is an official school
organ.""'
Morse is significant in the way that it emphasizes Hazelwood's limited
applicability and scope. If Hazelwood were to apply as broadly as some
federal courts suggest, the Court in Morse presumably would have applied
Hazelwood to the facts rather than carve out a new public policy exception
for drug-related speech. The Court recognized in its opinion that
Hazelwood is only triggered in highly specific circumstances,
circumstances that the Court felt were not at issue in Morse.
2. The School Imprimatur Trigger
The Court in Hazelwood held that the question of school-sponsored
speech arose only within the context of "school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents,
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school."890 Student homework, art projects, and show-
and-tell are excluded from Hazelwood's application because they are forms
of private expression not entailing government imprimatur. As then-Circuit
Judge Alito noted in Child Evangelism Fellowship v. Stafford, Hazelwood
applies only to government-sponsored speech; in other words, speech from
886 Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
887 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (allowing sanctions against a student for
offensively lewd and indecent speech despite a First Amendment challenge).
888 Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) ("But I do not read the opinion to mean that there are
necessarily any grounds for such regulation that are not already recognized in the holdings of this
Court.").
889 Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring).
890 Hazelivood, 484 U.S. at 271.
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"a public school or other government entity [that] aims to convey its own
message.""'
Unfortunately, many federal courts have overextended Hazelwood,
applying it to virtually any speech occurring in a school context in such a
way that public school boards have almost unlimited regulatory authority
over speech in that environment.89 2 Courts have reconfigured Hazelwood
from a limited exception into a general rule.
Yet Hazelwood presents itself merely as a device to protect schools from
having their names attached to speech reasonably perceived as presenting
their own points of view. The Supreme Court in Hazelwood repeatedly
offered the examples of school theater and school newspapers as
communication scenarios in which the public would reasonably perceive
school imprimatur.893 By contrast, student assignments confined to
classrooms and student-teacher relationships involve expressions of
exclusively private student voice, and thus operate outside of Hazelwood's
bounds. Classroom assignments and projects necessarily solicit personal
viewpoints and expression from students; consequently, it is not reasonable
to expect those activities to be understood as the official voice of the
school.
In specific situations of reasonably perceived government imprimatur,
Hazelwood gives schools the ability to pinpoint specific speech that departs
from their pedagogical objectives. Schools do not need to restrict broad
categories of speech or limit student expression altogether; rather, they need
to restrict and limit specific student communication within those contexts,
to avoid a perception that the school is advancing a point of view it does not
want associated with its educational voice.
B. Viewpoint in School Curriculum and Messaging
The absence of a viewpoint neutrality mandate in Hazelwood is also
sensible given the inseparability of viewpoints and pedagogical messaging
in the school environment. In Abington v. Schenpp, the Supreme Court
noted that "public schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of
891 Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 524 (3rd Cir.
2004) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)) (internal
quotations omitted).
See Waldman, supra note 8, at 64.
893 Hazelivood, 484 U.S. at 271-72.
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American citizens..."894 Abington and other cases emphasize the point that
American public schools exist as a device by which students are prepared to
enter the larger society as citizens of the sort the government prefers.15
While it can certainly be debated what objectives should be incorporated
into "the training of American citizens," the fact remains that such training
requires the advocacy of particular viewpoints and the disapproval of
others:...
Postmodernism has helped us to an appreciation that even the "information"
conveyed in school curricula is never "hard facts and figures" but screened data
presented from a cultural perspective. Accordingly, when a society educates its
youth, it cannot escape making judgments about the kind of citizens it wants its
children to become. Education is inevitably about ultimate truths or perceptions
thereof [.]897
To insert viewpoint neutrality into the Hazelwood rule (directed as it is to
essentially government speech) is both to mistake the nature of the
educational enterprise and to drastically affect the ability of schools to
control their educational function.'9 Viewpoint neutrality makes it
impossible for a public school to effectively accomplish its pedagogical
mission.8 99 Simply, viewpoint regulation of government speech allows
schools to do what they were established to do.
894 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
895 See Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 681; Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982) ("It ... seems
entirely appropriate that the State use 'public schools [to] .. inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political system.'").
896 Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn In School Today? Free Speech, Values
Inculcation, and the Democratic Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 84 (2002) ("Both the
selection of topics to be taught and decisions about what is to be taught concerning each topic inherently
imply certain choices as to social, moral, or political values .... Regardless of which side of this debate
one ultimately favors, the implications for present purposes should be clear: it is unrealistic to believe
that seemingly value-neutral curricular choices are completely free from significant, if often unstated,
substantive value judgments.").
897 Carl H. Esbeck, The Estabhlishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Government Power, 84 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 94 (1998).
898 Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government's Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its Oin
Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1317, 1334 (2004) ("[I]n situations where the government is the
'literal speaker' - i.e., the entity that is actually saying, writing, or otherwise directly delivering the
message - it should be permitted to decline to serve as the 'dummy' through which a private
ventriloquist projects her views."); R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the Surprising
Case for Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175, 187-88 (2007) ("[A] public school's
refusal to sponsor speech it deems incompatible with the shared values of a civilized social order will
typically be mediated by someone's possible acceptance or rejection of the viewpoint of the speech in
question, and will therefore be viewpoint-based regulation, reflecting approval of or hostility toward one
or more points of view.").
899 R. George Wright, Tinker and Student Free Speech Rights: A Functionalist Alternative, 41 IND. L.
REv. 105, 117 (2008) ("A school should not be legally handicapped for fairly taking its democratically
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C. Hazelwood's Implication of the Policy Behind the Government Speech
Rule
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the State's interest and authority
to promote its own favored viewpoints.'" In Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, the Court recited the relevant law as follows:
The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it
does not regulate government speech. See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Ass'n, 544 U. S. 550, 553 (2005) ("[T] he Government's own speech . . . is
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny"); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 139. n. 7 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("Government is not restrained by the First Amendment from
controlling its own expression"). A government entity has the right to "speak
for itself." Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S.
217, 229 (2000). "[1] t is entitled to say what it wishes," Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819. 833 (1995). and to select the views
that it wants to express. See Rust v. Sullivan. 500 U. S. 173, 194 (1991);
National Endowment for Arts v. Finley. 524 U. S. 569, 598 (1998) (SCALIA,
J., concurring in judgment) ("It is the very business of government to favor and
disfavor points of view').90 1
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, the
University of Virginia refused to direct funds generated from student fees
toward paying a printing bill for a Christian student newspaper. 902 The
Supreme Court reversed the decision from the Fourth Circuit and held that
withholding the funds was viewpoint discrimination, which inappropriately
infringed on the Free Speech Clause and undermined the neutrality toward
religion the Establishment Clause contemplated.90' Critically, the Court
explained that the allocation of student fees did not blur the line "between
the University's own favored message and the private speech of
students."904 The Court thus distinguished the rule that the government may
assigned and democratically supervised vital mission seriously on school grounds and during school
hours").
900 See e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) ("[T]he government may use its voice
and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman.") (emphasis
added); Blake R. Bertagna, The Government's Ten Commandments: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
and the Government Speech Doctrine, 58 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 8 (2009) ("[T]he Court observed that 'when
the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices."') (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833(1995)).
901 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2009).
902 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822-23.
903 Id. at 845-46.
904 Id. at 834; see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006) ("We
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discriminate based on viewpoint when the speech is the government's
own-a proposition for which, notably, the Court cited Hazelwood.905
In citing Hazelwood for that legal standard, the Court signaled that it
viewed that case as implicating the policy behind the government speech
doctrine. The affinity between Hazelwood and the government speech cases
is clear enough. Additionally, since the educational context is a pristine
instance of government interest in communicative autonomy, a public
school's regulation on viewpoint grounds of messages reasonably perceived
as bearing its imprimatur is in keeping with the Supreme Court's
recognition of government speech prerogatives.906
Five years after the Court's decision in Rosenberger, the Ninth Circuit
reemphasized the distinction between government speech and individual
student expression in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District.90' In
Downs, a teacher brought action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his school
district to allow him to post material on a school bulletin board that
contrasted with materials placed on the board as part of the district's Gay
and Lesbian Awareness Month.08 The Ninth Circuit rejected Downs's
assertion that Hazelwood controlled his case.' 9 The court reluctantly
conceded that it was bound under stare decisis to interpret Hazelwood
according to the viewpoint neutrality lens of the court's en banc holding in
Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School District. 9o However, the court
concluded that, notwithstanding Planned Parenthood's misguided
"viewpoint neutrality microscope," the school's actions in the present case
have held that high school students can appreciate the difference between speech a school sponsors and
speech the school permits because [it is] legally required to do so.").
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834; see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) ("It is inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies
within its constitutional powers but which nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere
convictions of some of its citizens.").
906 See Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 464 (holding that placing a permanent monument in a public
park constituted an exercise of government speech not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny); Johanns
v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("To govern, the
government has to say something..."). The standards guiding a finding of government speech depart in
certain respects from those employed in the Hazelwood analysis - due, no doubt, to the unique
educational environment at issue in the latter - but the policy justifications are identical.
907 Downs, 228 F.3d at 1009.
908 Id. at 1005.
909 Id. at 1011.
910 Id. Though stare decisis forced the Downs court to view Hazelwiood through the flawed
interpretation of Planned Parenthood, the court's reasoning in Downs remained sound. The court
correctly concluded that the bulletin board was clear government speech, and the school should
consequently not be forced to burden speech bearing its imprimatur with a viewpoint neutrality
requirement. Id. Downs remains an important case in illustrating the legal distinctions and impact of
government and student speech.
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did not implicate the court's own (albeit flawed) prior interpretation of the
Hazelwood rule."' The court noted that the only parties with control over
the bulletin board's content were school faculty and staff, and the bulletin
board was not open to the public or the student body as a kind of open
forum for wide discussion of political views.9 2 The Ninth Circuit cited
Rosenberger directly in its justification for granting the school district
control over the bulletin board's content.9 13 The court properly recognized
that in situations when the government unequivocally offers its own
viewpoint and value system in the public setting, the state must be allowed
to protect its voice by restricting content that might be perceived as an
extension of the state.9 4 A viewpoint neutrality mandate simply does not fit
properly into such an analytical context.
In a similar fashion, the Fifth Circuit considered in Chiras v. Miller
whether a high school student could bring action against the Texas State
Board of Education for refusal to approve a specific science textbook for
state funding.' 5  The court held that when the speech in question is
unambiguously the government's own, the state's authority to control and
protect its message operates independently from any viewpoint neutrality
mandate.9 16 Viewpoint neutrality is simply a different requirement for an
entirely different kind of speech. 1
911 Id.
912 Doivns, 228 F.3d at 1012 ("We do not face an example of the government opening up a forum for
either unlimited or limited public discussion. Instead, we face an example of the government opening up
its own mouth: LAUSD, by issuing Memorandum No. 111, and Leichman High, by setting up the Gay
and Lesbian Awareness bulletin boards. The bulletin boards served as an expressive vehicle for the
school board's policy of 'Educating for Diversity."'); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government
Speech: Identifying Expression 's Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 617 (2008) ("Concluding that the
bulletin board's contents continued to reflect the district's own expression even when it invited
individuals to join and contribute to it, the court held that the district could not be compelled to allow
others to distort its position.").
913 Downs, 228 F.3d at 1013 ("When the government is formulating and conveying its message, 'it may
take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted' by its
individual messengers.") (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
914 Id; see also Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[Hazeliood] described the
distinction it was drawing between speech protected by standards of Tinker and speech which the
educators could regulate as the distinction "between speech that is sponsored by the school and speech
that is not.") (internal citations omitted).
915 Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 607 (5th Cir. 2005).
916 Id. at 612 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
917 Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching That Speech Matters: A Frameiwork for Analyzing Speech Issues in
Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 825, 827 (2009) ("There is a critical distinction between the
government as speaker in setting the curriculum and the government as regulator in punishing student
speech.").
2013] 547
548 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVI:iii
D. The Effect of Over-Expanding Hazelwood's Scope
The confusion over the role of Hazelwood in public schools gives rise to
opinions like Bannon v. Palm Beach, a case in which the Eleventh Circuit
considered whether a school could compel a student to remove Christian
words and symbols from a mural painted as part of a school beautification
project."' The court ultimately held that the panels constituted school-
sponsored expression and that school had the authority to remove religious
content from the panels.' The problem with Bannon does not lie with the
court's conclusion; a strong case can be made (and indeed was made) that a
painted panel displayed indefinitely in a school would reasonably bear the
school's imprimatur. However, the court arrived at its holding by
unnecessarily analyzing whether the school's policy was viewpoint-
neutral.920 The court acknowledged earlier in the opinion that government
expression, even if delivered through the speech of an individual, may be
regulated due to its subject matter; no mention is ever made of a viewpoint
neutrality requirement.92' However, the court relied on its prior ruling in
Searcey to extrapolate that Hazelwood requires viewpoint-neutrality in the
regulation of student speech.922 Though the Bannon Court may have arrived
at the correct decision, its logic represents a dangerous pattern.
Hazelwood's actual language and intent is ignored, leaving courts to apply
their own language in any number of incorrect contexts.
In Fleming v. Jefferson County, the Tenth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of Columbine High School's policy against religious
references on student-designed painted tiles displayed in the school
hallways.92 ' The court upheld Columbine's policy, citing concerns over
religious debates and painful reminders of the school shooting as reasonable
pedagogical concerns.924
In the penultimate paragraph of Fleming, the court shored up its
argument against a viewpoint neutrality standard with dicta describing the
absurd conclusions that can result from a legal standard requiring a school
to employ only viewpoint-neutral speech regulation.925 The court considered
918 Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cnty, 387 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2004).
919 Id. at 1217.
920 Id. at 1215.
921 Id. at 1213.
922 Id. at 1215 n.4; see Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1325.
923 Fleming, 298 F.3d at 921-23.
924 Id. at 934.
925 Id.
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the burden on schools of having to select between the unattractive options
of allowing highly offensive speech, or disallowing patently innocuous or
favored speech, all in the name of viewpoint neutrality. 926 The court drove
the point home by concluding that, "when posed with such a choice,
schools may very well elect to not sponsor speech at all, thereby limiting
speech instead of increasing it." 927
Some scholars have suggested that the Rehnquist court passed up a
golden opportunity to settle this dispute when it denied certiorari to
Fleming in 2003 .928 The facts of the case appeared to set an ideal stage for a
firm decision from the court clarifying the gray areas of Hazelwood. The
permanent presence of the tiles in school hallways, the tension between
creative deference and faculty oversight in the project, and the shroud of
emotionality surrounding the dispute in the wake of the Columbine tragedy
all seemed to point to the Court confronting the issue head on. However,
the Court may well have passed over an opportunity, and its denial of
certiorari leaves unanswered Fleming's provocative argument in favor of
focused regulatory targeting of specific viewpoints to protect and facilitate
the pedagogical interests of the school whose voice is implicated in the
subject speech.
Fleming nonetheless confronted an important reality in school policy.
When schools are required to adopt policies that must turn a blind eye to
viewpoint, the schools must swing to either extreme on the spectrum of
expressive tolerance. The administration must choose between allowing a
wide range of student speech - including speech that misrepresents the
school's own voice and interests - and maintaining its pedagogical
function through a kind of Draconian comprehensive ban on all speech on
the subject in dispute. The dicta from Fleming focus specifically on the
latter scenario, but both eventualities are equally plausible and equally
unacceptable in a classroom context. In Fleming, the Tenth Circuit
recognized that the right of students to express themselves within a First
Amendment framework is an essential component of the American
926 Id.
927 Id.
928 Tobin, supra note 29, at 256 ("[T]he Court missed an opportunity to clarify the Hazelivood test
regarding viewpoint neutrality and let stand a holding that suppresses the free speech not only of
students, but also of parents and the local community."); see also Filipp Kofman, Fleming v. Jefferson
County: A Need for Viewpoint Neutrality, 22 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 151, 176 (2012); Katie
Hammett, Comment, School Shootings, Ceramic Tiles, and Hazelwood: The Continuing Lessons of the
Columbine Tragedy, 55 ALA. L. REv. 393, 407 (2003).
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Constitutional experience.929 Yet the court also recognized that a viewpoint
neutrality rule manifests its ill fit in the Hazelwood context through
inducing awkward and unnecessary overregulation of student speech.930
Viewpoint-based regulation provides schools with the tools necessary to
maintain control over their own voices and reputation without having to
"swing the pendulum" to one end or the other - in other words, either
having to leave their apparent imprimatur unregulated, or being forced to
protect their interest by eliminating participation in entire categories of
speech. Viewpoint-based regulation acts as a kind of precise surgical tool,
identifying specific problems without having to forbid student discourse
that does not interfere with the school's educational objectives.
E. A Note on Reasonableness
Critics of this approach to viewpoint-specific restrictions in public
schools may well approach a school's capacity for responsible policy with a
certain degree of libertarian cynicism. Government cannot be trusted to
implement viewpoint discriminatory policies in a truly responsible and
constitutional manner, they might argue, so it is ultimately better to give
schools a simple rubric by way of viewpoint neutrality.931 This concern is
not unfounded; after all, many public schools have routinely abused their
power by arbitrarily restricting student viewpoints that do not implicate the
imprimatur concerns that give rise to Hazelwood's rule.932
In light of these concerns, it is important to emphasize that the
viewpoint-specific speech restrictions authorized in Hazelwood must be
bounded not only by the "school-imprimatur" circumstance, but also by
pedagogical reasonableness in order to be constitutionally authorized.9"
At any rate, the discussion, whether one supports neutrality or viewpoint-
specific restrictions, must operate within the bounds of the assumption that
courts may regulate school policy within the rational context of Cornelius
and the curricular bounds set forth in Hazelwood.934
929 Fleming, 298 F.3d at 934.
930 Id.
931 See Joseph Blocher, Vieupoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REv. 695, 751-66
( 11).
Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of Hazelood, 26 GA. L.
REV. 253, 316 (1992).
933 R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based
Regulations, 31 S. Ill. U.L.J. 175, 204 (2007) ("A school's regulation of such speech ... must always at
a minimum promote a legitimate purpose of a public educational system in a reasonably tailored way.").
934 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 934 ("A number of constitutional restraints
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VI. CONCLUSION
Courts have vigorously debated the limits of school authority over
student speech, specifically a school's ability to regulate speech on the basis
of viewpoint under the terms of Hazelwood. Taken at face value, it is easy
to dismiss policies of viewpoint regulation as unduly censorial and instead
embrace viewpoint neutrality as the answer to protecting student expression
within the schoolhouse gate.' 5
However, a nuanced and disciplined examination of Hazelwood reveals
that courts and scholars may be having the wrong argument."' The Court
intended its holding in Hazelwood to apply only to a specific set of
circumstances: namely, theatrical productions, publications, and other
publically accessible activities that could reasonably bear the school's
imprimatur. In other words, the Court intended schools to have complete
control over speech that appears to be the official voice and opinion of the
school and ultimately the government. Viewing Hazelwood in this light, it
becomes apparent that schools must be given the authority to regulate this
kind of speech, and it is appropriate - indeed intuitive - that such
regulation be viewpoint-specific. Were schools given any less authority, the
government's voice would no longer be its own and would instead find
itself under the control of a polarizing noise of individual opinions and
contradictory viewpoints. Viewpoint neutrality simply has no place within
an accurate reading of Hazelwood.
Hazelwood, and the viewpoint regulation it allows, protects schools by
granting them the authority they need, no more and no less, to maintain a
singular institutional voice and to preserve the learning environment for
which they exist to foster in the first place.
continue to operate on public schools' actions, such as the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and substantive due process.").
935 See Samuel P. Jordan, Comment, Vieupoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Student Speech:
Avenues for Heightened Protection, 70 U. CH. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (2003).
936 Waldman, supra note 8, at 123 ("The confusion and dissension over whether Hazelwood permits
viewpoint-based restrictions has been an unfortunate byproduct of its overextension.").
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